CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 201

TOP SECRET

Page 201

As regards Europe, it was possible that there might be some

agreement between NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact powers which

would make it possible to achieve mutual force reductions, but we

could not plan on such a course and, without such agreement, We

were bound, both juridically and in the interest of our basic

security, not to carry out further reductions without the agreement

of our allies. Discussions during the previous year had demonstrated

their resistance to any further reductions of British forces in

Europe and we could not count therefore on being able to withdraw

more than a further brigade as was envisaged by the report: and even that was likely to be difficult to negotiate. In any event

we must retain the basic commitment and it was of greater

importance to withdraw wholly from commitments elsewhere. As

regards the Middle East it was pointed out that the presence of

our forces in the Persian Gulf and the maintenance of our commit-

ment to the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) had proved of great

importance to our interests in the supply of oil during the current

crisis in the Middle East, since they served to maintain our

relationship with Iran. This was essential to the continuation of

Iranian oil supplies, which were in turn of crucial importance to us at the present time. As regards the Far East the examination of

the damage which would be caused to the economy of Singapore even by

the rate of withdrawal envisaged in the report and the risk to political

stability in Singapore, which would thereby be involved, together with

the reactions of our other allies in this area during the recent series

of Ministerial discussions, had amply demonstrated that we could not,

consonant with our interests, withdraw all our forces and facilities

in Malaysia and Singapore by 1970-71. The need to obtain the

acquiescence of our allies had in fact already led the Cabinet not only to agree that we should aim to withdraw by 1975-76 but also that after our withdrawal we would maintain a military capability

for use in the Far East thereafter;

accordingly.

}

and we had informed our allies

-6-

Page 201

TOP SECRET

Page 201